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1 Introduction 
The 1870s marginal revolution in economics culminated a century later in a 
failure. The core utility maximization principle of this school of thought was 
shown to have no interesting implication for aggregate market behavior in 
general (Sonnenschein, 1972, 1973a, 1973b; Debreu, 1974; Mantel, 1974; 
Kirman, 1989; Shafer & Sonnenschein, 1993; Rizvi, 2006). We argue that 
neoclassical price theory was flawed from the beginning, owing to the more 
basic and more serious logical problem inherent to the axiom of price taking 
behavior, under which market price formation is left unexplained. This logical 
gap in neoclassical theory was filled essentially with thought experiments: 
 
1 Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, 1 University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA; 
mahamaninoua@chapman.edu  
2 Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, 1 University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA; 
vsmith@chapman.edu  
2 
  
 
Jevons  derives utility maximizing quantities, given prices, then postulates a 
‘theoretically perfect market’ in which every trader has complete information 
on supply and demand and the consequent equilibrium price(s) (Jevons, 
[1871] 1888, p. 87);3 Walras also derives utility maximizing quantities for given 
prices but imagines a fictional “auctioneer” who finds equilibrium prices by 
tatonnement adjustments that yield zero excess demand in each market 
before any contracts take place (Léon Walras, [1874] 1954).4 Although 
seriously incomplete, they and their general equilibrium followers, introduced 
the principle that rationality is a property of the individual, and indeed, 
rationality in the economy became identified with individual rationality 
throughout economics, game theory, and financial asset markets. Markets are 
rational if and only if their component individuals are rational. 
 
3 Howey (1989, pp 16–18) reports that In September of 1862, W. S. Jevons recorded the transmission of the 
paper “Notice of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy” to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science. The paper was read before the Association. However, only a short abstract was 
published in the Report of the Proceedings. This was the first articulation of the marginal utility and general 
equilibrium theories of economic equilibrium by Jevons launching the modern era of neoclassical equilibrium 
economics.    
4 Martin Shubik was not one to leave unexpressed his distaste for these approaches to modelling markets. His 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper (no. 368, 1974), was entitled, “A Trading Model to Avoid Tatonnement 
Metaphysics.” (cited in Smith, 1976, p 275, 279) 
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Many attempts at remedying these gaps in neoclassical price theory were 
unsatisfactory (Hahn, 1982; Fisher, 2013). Thus, “we shall have to conclude 
that we still lack a satisfactory descriptive theory of the invisible hand.” (Hahn, 
1982, p. 746) More recently and self-critically: “we do not have an adequate 
theory of value, and there is an important lacuna in the center of 
microeconomic theory. Yet economists generally behave as though this 
problem did not exist.” (Fisher, 2013, p. 35)  
Ironically, as we will explicate, the classical school, which the marginal 
revolution overturned, contains quite fruitful foundations for a theory of 
market price formation. The old school, as regards economic motives, relies, 
not on an unobservable criterion like an individual utility function, but on the 
individual’s willingness to sacrifice command over other goods, measured in 
an amount of monetary wealth, in order to acquire any given desired good. 
Thus, as Adam Smith notes, if two people equally desire an antique book at 
auction, the one with the larger wealth will carry it. He understands that tastes 
4 
  
 
(desires) matter, but also capacity for paying.5 Willingness to pay (WTP) value 
directly measures opportunity cost, or foregone purchases. Hence, it is a 
reservation price, clarified by the French followers of Smith as a maximum 
willingness to pay value price (WTP), and the sellers’ minimum willingness to 
accept value price (WTA).6 Section 2 justifies this reappraisal of classical 
economics. The market price of a good evolves through competition of buyers 
and sellers, which is by definition the process whereby firms undersell one 
another (seller-seller competition), or buyers outbid one another (buyer-buyer 
competition), or through the ‘higgling and bargaining’ of buyers and sellers 
(buyer-seller competition).  
This old view of the law of supply and demand is familiar and often taken for 
granted; it reappears intuitively in most introductory textbooks. But it has little 
 
5 Smith, we may infer, understood that the English auction procedure awards an item to the one person willing 
to pay more than anyone else in the auction room. People are diverse in tastes, in capacity and in “effective” 
demand. 
6 “Price” here is value per unit for the individual, a potential contract price in the market. The individual is 
modelled as comparing their maximum WTP value of a unit consumed with forthcoming offers from sellers, 
or bids from buyers, and is motivated to buy cheap. If a stable contract price emerges from the market it is a 
consequence of the interaction of the collection of all buyers and sellers in the market. The “rationality” of 
the market price emerges from this collective interaction depending on the institution of the market, such as 
the rules of double auction trading on an exchange.  
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to do with the neoclassical axiom of price-taking behavior (the negation of 
competitive behavior), the law of one price, or utility maximization. 
Throughout the neoclassical literature, whenever the price mechanism is 
explained terms of the interactive behavior of the buyers and sellers, the 
authors appeal essentially to the old view: notably the Austrian marginalists 
and Alfred Marshall. Moreover, laboratory market experiments, starting in the 
1950s, established the stability, efficiency, and robustness of the market 
mechanism under privacy conditions in which neoclassical theory would 
predict ‘market failures.’ These markets typically involve a small number of 
buyers and sellers with private knowledge of WTP (WTA) who compete 
through double-auction trading rules (bids, asks and acceptance messages). 
The experimental findings corroborated the old view of the price mechanism, 
as argued in Section 3.1. 
We revisit the history of market economics to extract the old conception of 
supply and demand before the marginalist revolution. It is not an exercise in 
historical scholarship for the sake of intellectual history only; rather it seeks to 
extract and emphasize the implicit methodology at the foundation of the 
classical view of a market economy, and to show that, despite any 
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shortcomings such as a coherent mathematical representation, it offers an 
operational starting point for constructing a theory of price closely allied with 
observables that reflect the experience of people in markets.  
As understood here, classical economics is not the labor theory of value, to 
which it tended to be reduced; of all the major classical economists, only 
Ricardo insisted on the labor theory of value as a general price theory, 
although even he conceded many qualifications to it. It is not the interminable 
classical controversies over essentially unsolvable, metaphysical issues that 
obscured the articulation of value theory from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall: 
the quest for the absolute measure of value and ultimate cause of value. 
Neither, a fortiori, is classical economics the gloomy predictions about the fate 
of mankind drawn from Malthus’ overpopulation thesis whose historical 
inaccuracy contributed to the demise of the classical school more generally 
along with the more scientific contributions of this school. (Adam Smith, held 
a more nuanced more positive view on the link between population and 
economic growth than most of his followers.) Finally, classical economics, as 
defended in this paper, is not an idolatry of the free market and a blind 
promotion of laissez-faire. (The classical economists emphasized forces in the 
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economy, notably excess bank credit, whose free play may destabilize the 
whole economy.)  
The subject matter of this paper being the theory of value, it may seem strange 
that we are referring to the classical school as a unified school of thought, and 
the very notion of “the” classical theory of price may seem dubious, especially 
if portrayed as a complete price theory centered on both supply and demand, 
so many are the doctrines and controversies on value associated to this school 
of thought, the labor theory of value being the most famous one. (To Adam 
Smith alone is usually associated various so-called value theories: a labor 
theory of value, a cost of production theory of value, an adding-up theory of 
value, and so on.) Beyond the various controversies among the classical 
economists, they seem to have achieved widespread agreement on 
competitive market price formation, the focus of this paper. This is what we 
mean by the classical theory of price. Underlying this classical view is a 
methodology, which, although not explicitly stated, can nonetheless be 
reconstructed.   
2 Rediscovering classical price theory  
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2.1 The classical methodology   
This old view on the price mechanism differs from the new one in two 
fundamental ways discussed in greater detail below: 
Principle 1: “Realism.” Market behavior is founded on concepts that are 
observable and operational. Supply and demand are classically defined by an 
observable, operational, monetary value: the reservation price—the buyer’s 
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) and the seller’s minimum willingness to 
accept (WTA).7   
Principle 2: Emergent rationality. Market interactions determine deep 
emergent properties that are the unintended consequences of people’s 
actions, the results of human actions and not of human design.     
 
7 The operational grounding of these valuation concepts can be further clarified. Let Rk (Qk) be the total 
amount that consumers are willing to pay for Qk total units, then Rk (Qk) is the potential industry total 
revenue, and Rk’ (Qk) is the potential demand for its product. Similarly, there is a WTA total potential 
expenditure by industry k, for inputs, Ck (Qk). See the discussion of induced value in section 3.6 below.      
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2.2 Reservation price as core concept  
From Adam Smith to Jules Dupuit demand is willingness to pay. Thus when 
Adam Smith explains the price mechanism in Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1904, 
Bk. I, Ch. VII), he associates demand with ‘those who are willing to pay’ a price.  
Malthus also states in his Principles that ‘demand will be represented and 
measured by the sacrifice in money which the demanders are willing and able 
to make in order to satisfy their wants.’ ([1820] 1836, p. 62) Say’s view is 
similar: an object’s utility to a person, he observed, can be measured by the 
sacrifice this person makes to acquire the object; so the utility of a good can 
be measured by the amount sacrificed in exchange for it—its market price. 
Dupuit (1844, 1849), refining J.B. Say’s intuition, emphasizes that use-value is 
measured by maximum willingness to pay, namely by what we call today the 
reservation price. J.S. Mill reached the same conclusion: ‘Value in use […] is 
the extreme limit of value in exchange’, that is, price ([1848] 1909, bk. 3, ch. 1, 
§ 2). Or: ‘the utility of a thing in the estimation of the purchaser, is the extreme 
limit of its exchange value.’ (bk. 3, ch. 2, § 1)  
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2.3 Supply and demand as distribution functions 
The demand side of classical price theory is more explicit in the French 
tradition8, not merely Dupuit and Say, but also a less-known author, Germain 
Garnier, who translated into French the Wealth of Nations, which inspired his 
Abrégé élémentaire des Principes de  l’économie politique ([1796] 1846). In the 
second edition of this book (1846, pp. 195-196), Garnier derived the law of 
demand from the distribution of willingness to pay, expressed as a portion of 
wealth consumers are willing to pay for a commodity, and he represented its 
distribution as a pyramid. J.B. Say and Jules Dupuit also adopted explicitly this 
pyramidal representation of demand (Say, 1803 [2006], vol. II, bk. II, ch. 1; 
1828 [2010], vol. I, part III, ch. 4; Dupuit, 1844, 1849).  
 
8 This French tradition on demand, and value more generally, is thoroughly covered in Ekelund Jr and Hébert 
(1999), interpreted as an anticipation or even the origin of the marginal-utility view on demand.  
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Figure 1: Pyramidal model of market demand (Garnier, Say, Dupuit). The pyramid 
(left) represents the distribution in society of wealth (top=the wealthiest, 
bottom=the poorest), or more precisely the distribution of consumers’ WTP. 
Market demand, at each price, is measured by the cross-sectional area of the 
pyramid corresponding to the price. If price is zero, all consumers can afford the 
good; as price increases, a lower and lower fraction of society can afford the good; 
and beyond some maximum value (125), none can afford the good.  
 
 
Cournot’s treatment of demand is this distributional view. Cournot is a pivotal 
figure in the transition from classical to neoclassical economics, for his view on 
demand is rigorously classical, though he went on to inspire much of the neo-
classical theory of supply.9 In a paragraph of his Researches ([1838] 1897, pp. 
 
9  Cournot’s model of oligopoly supply was not, however, integrated with the demand side to articulate a price 
formation process. Realizing the need to fill that gap, he put his equation expressing the law of demand, D = 
F (P), to work.  His suppliers each chose profit maximizing quantities given price, yielding total output equal 
to D. He then closed the loop by inverting F (P) to obtain D* = F(P*).  Jevons and Walras would later apply the 
same methodology. Each modelled demand (in their case, max utility given prices) but could not articulate 
market price discovery. They closed the loop by imagining “black box” sources of prices, Jevons’ perfect 
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49-50), he observed that market demand can be assumed to be a smoothly 
decreasing function of price, even though individual demand is realistically 
discontinuous: 
We will assume that the function F(p), which expresses the law of 
demand or of the market, is a continuous function, i.e. a function which 
does not pass suddenly from one value to another, but which takes in 
passing all intermediate values. It might be otherwise if the number of 
consumers were very limited: thus in a certain household the same 
quantity of firewood will possibly be used whether wood costs 10 francs 
or 15 francs the stere, and the consumption may suddenly be diminished 
if the price of the stere rises above the latter figure. But the wider the 
market extends, and the more the combinations of needs, of fortunes, 
or even of caprices, are varied among consumers, the closer the function 
F(p) will come to varying with p in a continuous manner. However little 
may be the variation of p, there will be some consumers so placed that 
the slight rise or fall of the article will affect their consumptions, and will 
 
information, or Walras’ metaphoric auctioneer.  Cournot’s “black box” contained his demand function, D = F 
(P), which is a distribution function of WTP values.   
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lead them to deprive themselves in some way or to reduce their 
manufacturing output, or to substitute something else for the article that 
has grown dearer, as, for instance, coal for wood or anthracite for soft 
coal.   
Individual demand is discontinuous for the obvious reason that goods are 
produced and consumed in discrete units. (There is no such thing as an 
infinitely divisible commodity.)10 Moreover, as Cournot emphasizes, a 
consumer responds to price changes in a discontinuous manner, reacting only 
when the price exceeds a threshold, namely a reservation price (15 francs in 
Cournot’s example). Yet demand can be a smoothly decreasing function of 
price on the aggregate by the law of large numbers, provided the distribution 
of reservation prices is sufficiently spread, which is the case if consumers ae 
diverse in need and fortune.    
Cournot’s intuition would resurface again and again in economics, starting 
from the early marginalists, many of whom invoke it to justify the treatment 
 
10 Items like cereals and liquids long have been prepackaged in discrete consumption bundles; recycling 
charges levied by firms for the return of used paper, rags, and bottles are hundreds of years old in the US 
fueled by cheap labor, and is of ancient origins.  
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of demand and supply as smooth functions, but usually fall back on the 
average-agent simplification, and not by considering explicitly the distribution 
of agents’ characteristics (Pareto, 1897, p. 9; Leon Walras, 1926, pp. 57-8; 
Jevons, [1871] 1888, pp. 89-90; Marshall, [1890] 1920, p. 83). (For example, 
Jevons appeals to the concept of “trading body” and Marshall, a 
“representative” consumer or producer.)  
The general principle of regularity by aggregation will reappear in various 
forms in economic theory. Some mathematical economists explored an 
abstract distributional view of demand, as a remedy when the arbitrariness of 
neoclassical demand culminated in the SMD problem, deriving the law of 
demand by aggregation over a diverse population of consumers’ preferences 
or wealth (Hildenbrand, 1983; Trockel, 1984; Grandmont, 1987).11 This 
distributional approach retains, however, some of the strong neoclassical 
regularities whereby continuous individual preferences are defined on a 
continuous commodity space.   
 
11 For a review, see Rizvi (1997). 
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2.4 Competition; a fundamental principle 
Interaction among buyers and sellers in the marketplace is simply competition, 
a confrontation which was so fundamental in classical price theory that J.S. 
Mill affirmed that ‘only through the principle of competition has political 
economy any pretension to the character of a science’ (Book I, Ch. IV, § 1). Yet 
competition lost its meaning in passive price-taking behavior during the 
marginal revolution. We formally restate it anew. Market competition takes 
two forms, which have precise distinguishing implications for both quantity 
allocation and price dynamics. Type 1 competition is that between the two 
sides of the market (buyer-seller confrontation, as in double auction 
exchange). Type 2 competition is that operating on each side of the market: 
on the demand side, when buyers compete to purchase a seller’s unit of a 
good, as in an English auction,  by the highest-value buyer outbidding all rival 
buyers and obtaining the unit to the exclusion of others. On the supply side: 
when firms compete, and the lower-cost firm undersells rival sellers and 
trades to the disadvantage of this latter. Units are allocated to buyers from 
highest to lowest priority ordering of their valuations, and to sellers, from 
lowest to highest costs. Both forms of competition yield directly the famous 
16 
  
 
‘law of supply and demand’; that is, demanders and suppliers, through their 
‘higgling and bargaining’ (Type 1 competition) or their outbidding and 
underselling (Type 2 competition), tend to offer or accept a higher price in case 
of an excess demand, and a lower price in case of an excess supply: hence price 
change and excess demand have the same sign, a key condition in classical 
theory because the integral of excess supply is a function V(P) that measures 
the overall distance between price and the distribution of reservation prices 
(values and costs), as in equations (2) and (3) below.  
The relevance of the supply and demand diagram has been greatly diminished 
in neoclassical theory, following Cournot’s typology of markets based on the 
number of buyers and sellers, which substituted for the old unified view of 
competitive market price formation, a diversity of price theories based on the 
number of sellers in a market. Thus, different theories are called for in the new 
school to deal with given states of monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, and so on; 
whereas the basic supply and demand diagram is believed to apply only in the 
vaguely defined limit of a large number of traders, or “perfect competition”. 
This is a major deviation from the old view, which the Austrian economists 
perfected in this respect. We shall illustrate graphically this unifying nature of 
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the classical view on competition using Böhm-Bawerk’s excellent example (see 
subsection 3.5). Experimental findings  also suggest a more general domain of 
validity of competitive price theory than is usually assumed (Plott, 1982; V. L. 
Smith & Williams, 1990).  
2.5 Market rationality as an emergent phenomenon; contrast with 
neoclassical theory’s appeal to the socialist economists.      
Adam Smith invoked his well-known invisible hand metaphor to convey the 
notion of an overall unintended order resulting from human action but not 
human design, a general theme of the Scottish Enlightenment (Hayek, 1978; 
V. L. Smith, 2009), which Friedrich Hayek would restate as a general theory of 
“spontaneous order” (Hayek, 1978), a tradition lost in the Jevons-Walras 
neoclassical transition that Hayek would progressively realize amid the 
socialist calculation debate. Hayek identified emergent market rationality with 
the ‘central problem of economics as a social science’, namely ‘how the 
spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each possessing only bits of 
knowledge, brings about a state of affairs in which prices correspond to costs, 
etc., and which could be brought about by deliberate direction only by 
somebody who possessed the combined knowledge of all those individuals.’ 
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(1937, p. 49) The market mechanism brings about an overall rational order 
which, to come about by conscious and deliberate direction, would require a 
sum of knowledge that no single mind can possess (Hayek, 1945, 1948, 1980). 
That is, the market price synthetizes a huge amount of information dispersed 
throughout the economy and hence rationally coordinates economic activity 
beyond the narrow scope of individual rationality. To assume perfect, 
complete, or common knowledge, or rational expectations on the part of 
every individual, is to renounce an explanation of this emergent order.  
In contrast, the neoclassical focus on the utility maximizing individual required 
market rationality to depend on individual action without providing price 
discovery mechanisms showing how efficient prices emerged out of a 
collective of such individuals.  Appeals to the rationality of one idealized agent 
fail to achieve this, be it Robinson Crusoe in an island economy,  the Walrasian 
“auctioneer” responsible for finding equilibrium prices for all commodities, or 
the macroeconomist’s representative agent, whose infinite horizon 
intertemporal utility optimization determines the optimal path of the whole 
economy. Taken literally, these are clearly metaphors of a centrally planned 
economy; a market economy being the opposite—an economy, the rationality 
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of which is concentrated in no single individual, nor any special subset of 
individuals.  
Indeed, neoclassical value theory makes perfect sense as a tool for socialist 
central planning, whereby the planner becomes the Walrasian auctioneer, 
fixing prices for the whole economy by trial-and-error adjustments 
(tatonnement). Then anonymous individuals, given these prices, choose 
optimal quantities. In the great socialist debate, Mises and Hayek had to 
confront this brilliant neoclassical case for socialism put forward formally by 
Barone ([1908] 1935), Lerner (1934), and Lange (1936, 1937), but already 
pointed out by Wieser (1893, ch. VI) and Pareto (1897, pp. 364-371; 1909, pp. 
362-364), who, without advocating socialism, sketched a rigorous neoclassical 
theory of its economy.   
2.6 Adam Smith’s sketch of market price theory 
Smith begins his narrative of price formation by describing the experience of 
producer-suppliers who, knowing their cost, bring corresponding quantities to 
market: 
“When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market 
falls short of the effectual demand, all those who are willing to pay 
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the whole value of the rent, wages and profit, which must be paid 
in order to bring it thither, cannot be supplied with the quantity 
which they want. Rather than want it altogether, some of them 
will be willing to give more. A competition will immediately begin 
among them, and the market price will rise more or less above the 
natural price, according as either the greatness of the deficiency, 
or the…eagerness of the competition.” (Smith, 1776; 1904, Vol 1, 
p 58) 
Notice from Smith’s careful choice of words that he is describing the 
interactive experience of sellers and buyers, and their responses in their 
shared context of interaction. Sellers know the “whole value” of their goods 
necessary to recover their costs. Buyers, whose wants are not all satisfied at 
that whole value price, are willing to pay more rather than want for it. 
Depending on the extent of the deficiency and their eagerness, competition 
among the buyers will raise the price. Smith’s language describes the 
experiences and actions of the actors in the market, as he observes, thinks 
about and models them. He is describing what a modern economist would say 
is excess demand, read off the supply curve and the demand curve as the 
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economist visualizes them in governing the Walrasian movement of prices in 
response to excess demand. Smith never uses this modern language because 
it is not part of the knowledge and experience of the actors. He describes 
behavior in its origins. For Smith there are indeed external outcome 
consequences for the people in markets and for society—no less than the 
causes of the wealth of nations! —but none of that is part of people’s 
experience or intentions. Smith’s thought process separates these distinct 
effects.  
Similarly, and contrastingly to the above,  
“When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it 
cannot be all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value of the 
rent, wages and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. 
Some part must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low 
price which they give for it must reduce the price of the whole. The market 
price will sink more or less below the natural price, according as the 
greatness of the excess increases more or less the competition of the 
sellers, or according as it happens to be more or less important to them to 
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get immediately rid of the commodity.”12 (Smith, 1776; 1904, Vol. 1, p. 59) 
For Smith “competition” means buyers bidding more, or sellers cutting 
prices.   
3 Revivals of the classical view  
From Alfred Marshall’s synthesis to experimental economics, important 
revivals of the classical paradigm have been attempted by scholars who at 
least intuitively felt greater proximity with this abandoned paradigm. There is 
of course the influence of Piero Sraffa, whose work seems to structure much 
of the modern scholarship on the classical theory of value (Sraffa, 1960). Yet 
Sraffa’s work is a revival of Ricardo’s system, and not a revival of classical 
economics as we consider it here. 
3.1 Experimental economics   
Although Marshall and the Austrian economist Böhm-Bawerk were significant 
spokesmen for neoclassical marginal utility theory, their articulation of price 
formation in markets did not depend in any way on their championing of the 
 
12 Smith distinguishes perishables from inventories of durables, going on to add: “The same excess in the 
importation of perishable, will occasion a much greater competition than in that of durable commodities; in 
the importation of oranges, for example, than in that of old iron.”   
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marginalist framework. Marshall’s ([1890] 1920, pp 332-4) description of price 
discovery in “a corn-market in a country town” is an elaboration of the 
Smithian-classical process applying WTP (WTA) reservation values to buyer-
seller “higgling and bargaining”. In this market context, marginal utility is 
neither applied nor mentioned by Marshall, because it is irrelevant to his 
demonstration of price formation. This perspective, however, is not part of the 
established understanding of Marshall, nor of his significant influence on early 
market experiments examining neoclassical supply and demand theory. 
Similarly, in Böhm-Bawerk’s ([1888] 1891, pp 198-208) peasant horse market, 
where each person is a buyer or seller of a single unit, first illustrated with one 
buyer and one seller, then one-sided competition (one seller, multiple buyers; 
one buyer, multiple sellers), and finally two-sided competition for multiple 
buyers and sellers. He elegantly demonstrates how—as we would describe it 
—adding buyers and sellers shrinks the trading gap between highest WTP and 
lowest WTA thereby narrowing the distance between the center of value in 
the market and the trader’s evaluations. In separate sections below, we return 
to a detailed discussion of these important contributions by Böhm-Bawerk and 
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Marshall that are plainly in the classical price formation tradition though 
penned by prominent neoclassical marginalists. 
It is in the laboratory that the classical view of price formation was destined to 
be literally replicated, although the first market experimenters considered 
themselves in the neoclassical marginal tradition as expounded by Marshall, 
whose influence  they acknowledge, unaware that Marshall was following 
closely the non-utilitarian classical tradition in describing price dynamics.13 
(Chamberlin, 1948, p 96; Smith, 1962, p 115, 121) 
3.2 Early Market Experiments were Rooted in Marshall and Considered 
Neoclassical. 
The first competitive market experiments set out to examine price and 
allocation behavior by assigning private values to 10-20 buyers, and private 
costs to a similar number of sellers. These were “small” numbers by the vague 
thought standards of the time. Inspiration for this design came from four 
motivating sources: (1) Jevons (1871) provided the background utility-
maximizing choice model, although the implementation was with discrete 
 
13 Smith’s opening paragraph refers to “neoclassical competitive markets.” 
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units having no explicit connection with utility maximization—an afterthought 
reconstruction (Smith 1976). (2) The context was consciously in the tradition 
of Marshall ([1890] 1920) in that S&D operated as flows of nondurable goods 
into and out of the market over successive price making periods in the belief 
that if equilibrium is attainable it must somehow involve learning over time. 
(3) Chamberlin’s (1948) experiments had pioneered the procedure used to 
represent supply and demand, later generalized as “the theory of induced 
value.” (Smith, 1976) (4) Finally, prices formed endogenously, among the 
participant subjects, in a unifying collective search, by independent privately 
informed traders, for economic value via the bid-ask continuous “double 
auction” protocol long operating in the Chicago commodity markets and New 
York Stock Exchange. (Leffler, 1951) Buyers were each assigned a single private 
value, “which represents the maximum price he is willing to pay for one unit…” 
(Smith, 1962, p 112) A unit bought below this maximum willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) earns a profit in cash equal to the difference between the private value 
and the price paid in the experiment. Each seller is assigned a private value 
(cost) representing their personal minimum willingness-to-accept (WTA) for a 
unit and earns a profit in cash equal to the difference between the selling price 
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and that value. Thus, Marshall and Leffler inspired the elements that 
distinguished the new experiments from those reported earlier by Chamberlin 
(1948) that had failed to yield the competitive equilibrium. However, there 
was no prior expectation that the results of the new experiments would differ 
qualitatively from those of Chamberlin, although the falsifying conclusion 
might be more powerful under conditions putatively more favorable to 
equilibrium emergence.  
Chamberlin’s experiments were also explicitly and firmly thought to be in the 
neoclassical tradition associated with Marshall. Thus, Chamberlin (1948, p 96) 
implemented S&D by giving each buyer (seller) a “ticket” representing their 
individual “Marshallian demand price or supply price…”.14 Marshall, and those 
following his example who thought they also were following the neoclassical 
tradition, had explicitly stated, and interpreted demand (supply) as 
representations of willingness-to-pay (WTP) and to-accept (WTA) reservation 
 
14 Chamberlin (1948, p 95) draws on the neoclassical tradition of both Jevons ([1871] 1888) and Edgeworth 
(1881), but without citation. His experiments were “designed to illuminate a particular problem….that of the 
effect of deviations from a perfectly and purely competitive equilibrium [Jevons’ proposition] under 
conditions (as in real life) in which the actual prices involving such deviations are not subject to ‘recontract’ 
(thus perfecting the market) [Edgeworth’s construction] but remain final.       
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prices.15 Hence, the reservation price language prevailed and was sufficient, 
without the trappings of utility theory: “These reservation prices generate a 
demand curve such as DD…(Smith, 1962, p 112). Implicitly, they were 
“marginal” units, as were subsequent cases assigning more than one unit, each 
interpretable as marginal reservation WTP (WTA) “prices.” Note, however, 
that if each buyer (seller) is a single unit trader, marginal value is identical with 
total individual value. If aggregated over all individuals in a large market, 
demand (supply) is a schedule of the maximum the market will pay (minimum 
it will accept), rather than go without each unit. This representation 
corresponds to that of the classical, not that of the neoclassical, paradigm. It 
generalizes if any or all have a demand for a second or third unit, etc., which, 
in the classical perspective might have lower urgency but with the important 
measurable feature that less would be paid for it. Hence, in retrospect, the 
 
15 “This article reports on a series of experimental games designed to study some of the hypotheses of 
neoclassical competitive market theory.” (Smith, 1962, p 111) Skepticism, reflecting prevailing beliefs, is plain: 
“These schedules do nothing beyond setting extreme limits to the observable price-quantity behavior in that 
market. All we can say is that the area above the supply curve is a region in which sales are feasible, while the 
area below the demand curve is a region in which purchases are feasible…. We have no guarantee that the 
equilibrium defined by the intersection of these sets will prevail, even approximately, in the experimental 
market (or any real counterpart of it).” (Smith, p 114) 
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early experimental environments were classical to the core, where the double 
auction rules of interacting and trading governed the “higgling and bargaining” 
process.     
Later, as experimental economics gained traction in research and teaching, 
experimentalists encountered the methodological objection that experiments 
are not about the application of economic theory to economic problems 
involving real goods. One effective response was to demonstrate such a 
connection using Jevons’ formalism showing how, through monetary rewards 
in the laboratory, we can induce a specified demand and supply on abstract 
items, or on the decisions in any economic environment familiar to 
economists. (Smith, 1976) Hence, “Induced value theory” formally relied on 
the commonly accepted neoclassical continuity of individual utility functions, 
while proposing discrete multiple unit implementations as reserve prices. 
Since US currency had value, or “utility” to all, money earned as a function of 
action induced monetary value on marginal successive action decisions. The 
intent and purpose of this rhetorical formalism was to shift the burden of proof 
to other neoclassicists as to why this was not what all economists were up to 
in their daily routines. Hence, the inference, that the lab microcosm was a 
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recognizably familiar environment to all economists for the study of economic 
action. However, the continuous utility formalism obscured its classical 
observational foundations in people’s revealed WTP (WTA). That it was an 
essay in persuasion is plain in the following summary assertion: 
“The laboratory becomes a place where real people earn real money 
for making real decisions about abstract claims that are just as "real" as 
a share of General Motors.” (Smith, 1976, p 275)   
3.3 Experiment Results Were a Victory for Markets, A Failure for 
Jevons/Walras Theory. How Do We Explain/Model the Observed 
Convergence?  
In the early experiments none of the conditions believed to be strictly 
necessary by Jevons and the economics profession were satisfied. All value 
information was private,16 numbers were “small”; no participant in the double 
auction mechanism was a price-taker; each participant was a maker of prices, 
who entered bids or asks, as well as a taker of prices, in the sense that they 
 
16 At the start of trading in an experiment, and at the typical market opening on an Exchange, there is always 
a first bid or ask, and therefore public information volunteered by a private participant. Such action, however, 
is a challenge to the theory of optimal action.  
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accepted a standing best bid or ask entered by another person. For these 
reasons, the strong expectation was that equilibrium would not emerge. 
Unaccountably, prices and exchange quantities converged to near-equilibrium 
levels in a few rounds of trading. The conjecture that this might be a non-
confirming artifact of symmetry in buyer and seller surplus failed to find 
support, as new experiments with asymmetric designs showed empirically 
that the first results generalized.  What, however, best explains the replicable 
observed dynamical equilibrating motion in these markets—the Walrasian, 
the Marshallian, or some other mechanism? 
Early in the first reported experiments, the transactions in two experiments 
(Smith, 1962, Test 2 and 3) conflicted with the neoclassical Walrasian 
hypothesis that prices increase (decrease) in proportion to positive (negative) 
excess demand.  (Smith, 1962, p 116, 119)  The data also conflicted with the 
Marshallian hypothesis that the exchange quantity is an increasing function of 
the excess of the demand price over the supply price, “but this hypothesis 
would seem to be worth considering only in market processes in which some 
quantity-adjusting decision is made by the marketers.” (Smith, 1962 footnote 
7) In retrospect, this quotation reveals a failure to appreciate the short-side 
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rationing principle inherent to classical analysis, depending on whether initial 
prices begin below or above the unknown equilibrium level. Thus, at a lower 
price level, purchases are limited by supply, at the higher, sales are limited by 
demand. This short-side feature is central to our formal theory of classical 
markets, and critical to the classical characterization of the price formation 
process. This condition, reflecting the disequilibrium state of demand and 
supply, is foreign to trader understanding, but very much part of their 
experience and knowledge-how to function. If product purchases are limited 
by supply, the corresponding demand price is temporarily above supply price 
and the shortage condition experienced by the traders leads naturally to price 
increases to “ration” the limited supply. If product sales are limited by 
demand, the corresponding supply price is temporarily above the demand 
price, and the losses experienced by the traders leads naturally to seller price 
cutting.  Note that the experimental protocol does not follow Adam Smith’s 
narrative in specifying what sellers “brought to market.”17 Rather, the market 
 
17 That narrative, however, applies to one experiment reported in the Appendix by Smith (1962). Unlike the 
other experiments and the discussion in the text, in this experiment subject sellers were required to decide 
their production levels in advance, then enter or not the market with those inventories. The sunk-cost 
property of that experiment led to distress sales, low initial prices, and gradually increasing prices across 
successive trading periods, as sellers learned that buyers were willing to pay much higher prices than sellers 
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is for goods made to order; each knows their capacity; people start trading, 
and the initial contract prices may be below or above equilibrium. In each case, 
however, the principles of short side rationing still apply to our modelling of 
the price adjustment process. Significantly, the adaptations to short-side 
rationing involves reducing loss or increasing gain, and therefore lives in the 
profit space of the actors who are focused on gain or loss for a next unit to be 
exchanged. This is obscured in the metaphor of Walras’s auctioneer who seeks 
a price that equates total units supplied with total units demanded—a 
mechanism that invites withholding to get an advantage in profit space. 
Evident here, in the theory of price formation, is the theorist, anxiously 
wanting to implement his theory, not to observe the experience and actions 
of those in the market and to model them.  (See footnote 9)  
Marshall’s effort to synthesize the classical and neoclassical traditions does 
not recognize classical short-side rationing principles. Rather, Marshall 
assumed that goods were in short-run inelastic supply (like Adam Smith’s 
perishable oranges). Hence, his demand price was above (below) the long run 
 
were settling for initially. In effect, the product was perishable, as there is no provision in the experiment for 
allowing the carryover of unsold inventories into the next period.    
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supply price, causing profit maximizing entry (loss minimizing exit). With 
personal services and appliance or home maintenance services, and goods 
made to order (hamburgers), consumption (delivery) commonly occurs after 
market pricing. Hence, one does not make units that fail to be sold; supply is 
therefore elastic, and responses based on short side rationing are part of day-
to-day short run price decision-making.     
The surprise finding in the first experiments, that prices tended strongly to 
converge, called for an explanation. The data and reasoning in 1962 indicated 
that the equilibrating force of price adjustment in these markets is more 
strongly related to money being left on the table in the absence of 
adjustment—profit foregone—than to the neoclassic-ally dominant Walrasian 
excess demand hypothesis, WH. Convergence was in price-profit space which 
included quantities, incidentally part of finding prices that were mutually 
profitable.       
Figure 2 provides a classically informed analytic treatment of the discoveries 
related to the similar figure 1 in Smith (1962, p 130). We will first illustrate the 
issues seen then as culminating in the proposed “excess rent” hypothesis, and 
second illustrate how this perspective both informs, and is modified by careful 
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attention to classical analysis.18 This narrative will anticipate many of the 
elements we summarize more formally below.  
At P(t) < P*, the total market implied surplus, V(P), is identified as: 
V (P) = B + S + F + E, 
where, B + F + E = buyer surplus; S = seller surplus at price P(t), or the “virtual 
surplus” in Smith (1962; Figure 1), since it is not realizable but figures into the 
equilibrating dynamics. 
Equilibrium Marshallian surplus is  
EQ (P*) = B* + S* + F* + E* = B* + S*; F* = E* = 0. 
Therefore, excess rent at P (t) < P*,  
E = V (P) – EQ (P*), 
is simply the deviation of the “virtual” rent at price P(t) from Marshall’s 
 
18 We are more explicit below in integrating Smith’s narrative into the mathematical formulation of classical 
price theory. That narrative is rich and permeates how Marshall and Böhm-Bawerk envisioned price formation 
in their descriptions. 
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Figure 2 Short-side Rationing and Classical Price Adjustment. 
  
36 
  
 
consumer plus producer equilibrium surplus. Differing only by a constant, V(P) 
and E (P) are equivalent indicators of the price-value gap we describe below 
because they converge to the minimum of this gap, at (P*, Q*).  
Smith (1962, p 133) empirically conjectured that price adjusts proportionately 
to E, the surplus profit that will fail to be captured unless there is an increase 
in the price, P(t) < P* (or lowering it if P’(t) > P*). Virtual surplus, V (P) (and 
therefore E(P)) is minimized at equilibrium, i.e., an efficient market minimizes 
the profit reward necessary to exactly balance demand against supply, a 
proposition on efficiency that exuded with intuitive appeal. The reported 
analysis of the data across all the experiments tended to support this “excess 
rent” hypothesis (hereafter, ERH), as against the Walrasian hypothesis, WH. 
(Smith, 1962, pp 127-132) Missing in this abstract description of price 
formation was a more precise specification of the “higgling” trading process 
that shrinks E while raising (or lowering) the market price.  
Now modify the above argument to include classical short-side rationing, 
which we illustrate by further reference to Figure 2. We follow the argument 
in Smith, ([1776] 1904, Chapter VII), “Of the natural and market price of 
commodities.” By “normal price,” Smith means supply price—the price that 
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covers all unit costs including a unit profit necessary to bring forth and sustain 
the corresponding quantity in supply.19 When the quantity “brought to market 
falls short of the effectual demand (Ǭ in Figure 2), all those who are willing to 
pay the whole value” of the supply price P, in Figure 2, “which must be paid in 
order to bring it thither, cannot be supplied with the quantity they want” (Qd 
in Figure 2). Smith ([1776] 1904, p 58)20  Similarly, “When the quantity brought 
to market (Qs’ in Figure 2) exceeds the effectual demand (Ǭ in Figure 2), the 
market price falls below the natural; it cannot be all sold to those who are 
willing to pay the whole value (P’ in Figure 1)….Some part must be sold to those 
 
19 Marshall (1890, p 347) importantly clarifies and extends the concept of normal supply price, which “is the 
real drift of that much quoted, and much-misunderstood doctrine of Adam Smith and other economists that 
the normal, or "natural," value of a commodity is that which economic forces tend to bring about in the long 
run.” 
20 Notice that in Smith’s specification, sellers need have no perception that price is “below equilibrium.” They 
simply experience the fact that when they bring Qs = Ǭ to market they find that buyers want to buy more 
than the trucked amount, and each responds naturally in their interest. Similarly, when they bring Qs = Qs’ > 
Q* to market, they cannot profitably dispose of it and cut prices. Each knows his cost and, together with other 
sellers, know that market prices enable better or worse terms relative to those costs, and proceeds to adjust 
accordingly. Each may have beliefs, including conspiratorial beliefs that have no foundation, but each knows 
what to do—Ryle (1946) calls it knowledge-how as distinct from knowledge-that.        
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who are willing to pay less, and the low price which they give for it must reduce 
the price of the whole.”21 (WN, p 59)    
If someone in the market posts a bid (or ask), others may “enter” the 
competition for that unit. Hence, in general, at any temporary price, P(t) < P*, 
or symmetrically by construction, at P’(t) > P*, short side volume is Q = Ǭ and 
we now write explicitly that if price is P, then        
 V(P) = B (P, Ǭ) + S (P, Ǭ) + F (P, Ǭ) + E (P), 
where B (S) is buyer (seller) realizable surplus and F is the disequilibrium 
surplus due to short side rationing and a source of lost profit if price fails to 
adjust. As “virtual surplus,” V(P) measures, and serves as a collective summary 
signal of potential profit for all buyers and sellers. Each trader, a fragmentary 
part of the profit, V(P), is motivated to concede in the interest of capturing 
their individual part of the surplus. To concede in profit space is to out-bid a 
fellow buyer or seller but waiting for concessions from the other side is also 
part of the process. In the experiments think of P(t) as a temporary resting or 
 
21 Recall that in the experiments all goods (services) are non-durable and made to order. Unlike Smith’s 
narrative we do not have sellers with inventories “brought to market;” all sellers are present and eager to sell 
in the market.  
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trial price (bid or ask) at which the most urgent buyers receive profit up to B 
(P, Ǭ), and the most eager sellers earn up to S (P, Ǭ). Indeed, experiments 
verify that the traders contained in these sets (highest value and lowest cost) 
tend to contract with each other. Hence, the total (or overall) realizable 
surplus, at price P, is V(P) constrained by short-side rationing, or: 
 TS(P) = B (P, Ǭ) + S (P, Ǭ). 
The set F defines contract-feasible prices greater than P(t) for closing the price-
value gap. Buyers that are profitable in F easily outbid the lower valued buyers, 
and the sellers profitable in F easily undercut their higher cost rivals. Hence, 
efficient new contracts invade F, and the total surplus B+S+F is shared among 
the collective of all buyers and sellers.  
A similar argument applies if the price P’ is the temporary trial price. The 
numerous experimental markets that achieve full efficiency are effectively 
narrowing the price-value gap through competition to capture contracts in the 
sets S and B, but also F. The “higgling” and contracting action by the collective 
of traders directly operates to shrink the set F. The set E and the price-value 
gap efficiently decline because F is shrinking—a (classical) regularity property 
of the experiments that is not part of the argument, and not made plain, in 
40 
  
 
Smith (1962; Figure 1), that we seek here to correct; nor of course is it plain in 
Marshall.22 
Smith’s (1962, pp. 129-133) original motivation was empirical, not theoretical. 
He noticed that the sequantial transactions prices in his experiments did not 
follow the rule whereby price changes were governed propoprtionalely by 
excess demand; rather, the profit potential in a contrct mattered. To measure 
and preddict its effect, he calculated the surpus (”rent”), V (P), below the 
demand curve and above the supply curve for an arbitrary price, P. He then 
normaized V (P) by subtracting Marshall’s equilbrium total surplus, calling the 
difference, “excess rent”. Then he regressed the forward price change at 
transaction t on execess demand at t; and separately a regression on excess 
rent at t for the time series observatuions from ten primary (and five auxillary) 
independent experiments. (Smith, 1962, Tables 1 and 2). This evidence implied 
 
22 Value (WTP) is the potential-price dependent variable as in Marshall, and in the experimentalists 
representation of demand (supply). And also in the classical model where WTP (WTA) values depend on 
independently given quantity units of commodity. Total surplus, TS (P) imposes short side rationing for 
quantities that support P ≠ P*, and the dynamic market response distinguishes demand price (WTP) from 
supply price (WTA). If P < P*, Q increases with entry as P increases; if P’ > P*, Q increases with entry as P 
decreases. Demand price exceeds supply price, and P becomes the independent variable in characterizing the 
price adjustment effects, V (P) or TS (P).   
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a tendeency for exess rent to beat excess demand in predicting equilibrium 
convergence with higher confidence  (lower t-values).  
However, none of the original experiments were specifically dsigned to 
perform a comparison test that would cleanly distingush these alternative 
prediction hypotheses.  
In a subsequent study this problem was addressed using the “swastika” supply 
and demand exhibiting constant excess demand (supply) but declining excess 
rent; where excess rent = price x excess supply. (Smith, 1965; illustrated in 
Figure 8 below.) Hence, under the excess demand hypothes, price changes 
decay linearly with transactions; under the excess rent hypothesis price 
changes decay expoentially with transactions.  The new experiments offered 
stronger support for excess rent.    
3.4 Mathematical theory of classical price formation 
Missing in this exercise was its connection with the classical price discovery 
process. That process leads naturally to characterizing market adjustments in 
profit opportunity space, and to the “Principle of Maximum Information” 
(PMI), which is more fundamental than the mechanistic law of supply and 
demand: PMI, minimizes the distance between market price and the center of 
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social-economic value. That center is more general than market clearing 
because it embraces short-side rationing, thereby including constant cost 
industry (and constant value demand) cases. The relevance of this 
generalization of competitive equilibrium is clearly illustrated in the swastika 
experimental design alluded to above. (V. L. Smith, 1965) 
We provide here only a brief sketch of our classical mathematical theory of 
price discovery as it relates to the early experimental market literature. [See 
Inoua and Smith (2020) for a more complete statement with proofs.] 
Competition of traders implies the law of supply and demand: consider a 
transaction price move from
t
p to
1t
p resulting from competition of traders. If 
this price move involved more units demanded than supplied, then 
1
,
t t
p p
otherwise, 
1
.
t t
p p The number of units buyers and sellers can afford to buy 
and sell respectively is by definition given by the distribution of values and 
costs ( )D D p and ( ).S p The law of supply and demand then reads: 
 
1
[ ( ) ( )] 0.
t
t
p
p
S x D x dx  (1) 
Let  
 
0
( ) (0) [ ( ) ( )] ,
p
V p V S x D x dx  (2) 
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which is in fact none other than the famous area below supply and demand 
linked to the ERH referred to in Section 3.1:23  
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) .
p
p
V p S x dx D x dx  (3) 
then the LSD asserts that this function is decreasing in time (technically, it is a 
Lyapunov function) 
 
1
( ) ( ).
t t
V p V p  (4) 
This characterization of the LSD suggests a more general definition of 
competitive equilibrium than market clearing, which needs not hold, supply 
and demand being (discontinuous) step functions by construction. The 
competitive attractor is naturally the set of prices over which the function V is 
minimum, which we call the center of value: 
 argmin .C V  (5) 
   
 
23 It was denoted R, for “rent”, in V. L. Smith (1962). 
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Figure 3: No market-clearing price exists for this market. The 
relevant equilibrium concept here is v1, which can be shown to 
minimize market imbalance: we shall refer to this more general 
concept of competitive equilibrium, the center of value.  
The fact that supply and demand are distribution functions has an important 
implication. It can be shown that V indicates the overall distance between 
price and the distribution of reservation prices (values and costs), hence we 
shall call it the price-value gap, value meaning, more generally, all the 
reservation prices, costs included (cost is seller’s value): 
 ( ) | | | |,
v p c p
V p v p c p  (6) 
where the notation means summation of all values v p and all cost ,c p  the 
qualification being due to that fact that no units will be traded at a loss. 
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Equation (6) establishes C as a generalized median of the distribution of values 
and costs. (Without the condition of mutually advantageous trade, we would 
have a simple median, as is known from elementary statistics.) Thus, from the 
collective “higgling and bargaining” of traders each competing to extract 
surplus from trade, emerges a deep rationality of the aggregate: the traders 
are in fact unthinkingly causing the price to reflect in the best way their 
valuations of the good. Competitive price is a robust summary of value. This 
emergent informational optimization of the market can be phrased in the 
language of Shannon information theory.  
Consider again a move in the standing transaction price from 
t
p  to 
1t
p due to 
competition of the traders. This price move reveals information about the 
traders’ underlying valuation that can be naturally quantified as a gain in 
information a la Shannon (1948): 
  
1
1
( )
( ) ( ) log .
( )
t
t
p
t t p
D x
I p I p dx
S x
 (7) 
The total accumulated information gain from an initial price
0
p to the current 
price p  is  
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0
0
( )
( ) ( ) log .
( )
p
p
D x
I p I p dx
S x
 (8) 
which is well-defined for transaction prices, which are in the interval 
[min( ),max( )].c v 24 The law of supply and demand, as above formulated, can be 
phrased equivalently as 
 
1
( ) ( ).
t t
I p I p  (9) 
In other words, competition of traders is such that price reveals information 
about value better and better, until maximum information is revealed, which 
is the case when price converges in the center of value ,C which is also the set 
of prices for which I is maximum, as can be shown.  
We refer to this informational characterization of competitive dynamics as the 
principle of maximum information (PMI).25  
 
24 The unit of information depends on the base of the logarithm, the standard choice being the base 2, 
corresponding to bits of information. The initial information I(p0) is of no major significance (since we are 
interested in the amount of information generated); so, we set it arbitrarily to 10 in the illustrations below. 
25 This characterization of classical competitive price dynamics is a generic, qualitative, “nonparametric”, one: 
it does not depend on the specifics of the distribution of reservation prices, nor the speed of price adjustment, 
which involve parameters that likely depend on the specifics of the market institution. An extensive 
experimental literature developed on the rules of trading for a host of institutions, modern and ancient (Holt, 
in Roth & Kagel, 1995, pp. 360-377.) Among the market institutions, the continuous double auction, discussed 
in subsection 3.1, is particularly interesting, in that it involves all forms of competitions: buyer-buyer, seller-
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3.5 Illustration of the PMI: Böhm-Bawerk Horse Market 
Market 1: Isolated exchange (1 buyer, 1 seller) 
Buyer Value  Seller Value  
30 10 
 
Bohm-Bawerk’s conclusion ([1888] 1891 pp. 198-9): equilibrium bargaining 
range: [10,30] 
Center of value C = [10,30]. 
 
seller, and buyer-seller. Various models of this specific market institution have been offered in the 
experimental literature (Friedman, 1991; Cason & Friedman, 1996; Gjerstad & Dickhaut, 1998; Anufriev, 
Arifovic, Ledyard, & Panchenko, 2013; Friedman, 2018).   
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         Figure 4: One-sided (seller) competition (3 buyers, 1 seller). 
 
Market 2: One-sided (buyer) competition (3 buyers, 1 seller) 
Buyer Value  Seller Value  
30 10 
28  
25  
22  
20  
 
Bohm-Bawerk’s conclusion ([1888] 1891, p. 201): equilibrium bargaining 
range: [28,30] 
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Center of value C = [28,30]. 
 
        Figure 5: One-sided (buyer) competition (3 buyers, 1 seller). 
 
Market 3: One-sided (seller) competition (3 buyers, 1 seller) 
Buyer Value  Seller Value  
30 10 
 12 
 15 
 20 
 25 
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Bohm-Bawerk’s conclusion ([1888] 1891, p. 202): equilibrium bargaining 
range: [10,12]. 
 enter of value C = [10,12]. 
 
           Figure 6: One-sided (buyer) competition (3 buyers, 1 seller). 
 
Market 3: Two-sided (buyer-seller) competition (3 buyers, 1 seller) 
Buyer Values Seller Values  
30 10 
28 11 
26 15 
24 17 
22 20 
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21 21.1 
20 25 
18 26 
17  
15  
 
Böhm-Bawerk’s conclusion ([1888] 1891, p. 207): equilibrium bargaining 
range: [20,20.1] 
Center of value C=[20,20.1]. 
 
Figure 7: Two-sided (buyer-seller) competition (3 buyers, 1 seller). 
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Notice that all markets clear in Böhm-Bawerk’s discussion: hence the value 
center C refers merely to the set of clearing prices. The importance of this 
graphical illustration, besides the informational dimension, should be obvious, 
however: it shows the general domain of validity of the supply and demand 
diagram (often narrowed to a hypothetical “perfect competition”).  
The PMI applies also to non-clearing markets as well, as illustrated below.  
 
Figure 8: Illustration of a well-behaved non-clearing market. A swastika supply 
and demand configuration studied experimentally (V. L. Smith, 1965). 
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Simple as they may look, these illustrations nonetheless call into question the 
centrality in economic theory of abstract assumptions suggested by a priori 
belief in the necessity of “perfect competition” and “market clearing”: “large 
number of traders”, infinitely divisible commodity, continuous preference 
relation, and so on. 
3.6 Alfred Marshall  
Marshall’s theory of supply and demand is expressed in classical language. 
However, it is based on neoclassical principles (Bk. 3, Ch. 3), seeking to derive 
an individual’s quantity choices from their utilities. This dichotomy stems from 
Marshall’s intention to integrate classical market analysis, which he viewed 
with great admiration and relevance, with the neo-classical marginal utility 
calculus, which he believed brought important new insights and had been 
missing in the old framework. While his exposition was described in detail (bk. 
5), Marshall chose not to reproduce explicitly its mathematical derivation; this 
led to ambiguity in its meaning and interpretation because of the inherent 
conflict between price formation as a process, and the derivation of optimal 
individual quantity responses to hypothetically given prices. We will 
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reconstruct Marshall’s theory, while bearing this dichotomy in mind, and 
commenting thereon in context.  
Marshall’s statement of the theory goes as follow. “Suppose, for instance, that 
tea of a certain quality is to be had at 2s. per lb….a person might be willing to 
give 10s. for a single pound once a year rather than go without it 
altogether…But…he buys perhaps 10 lbs. in the year…the difference between 
the satisfaction which he gets from buying 9 lbs. and 10 lbs. is enough for him 
to be willing to pay 2s…it measures the marginal utility to him” of buying the 
10th pound. (Marshall, 1890, p. 94-5) In this example Marshall refers to 2s as 
the person’s marginal demand price. Let ( )P x be the amount the consumer is 
willing to pay forx units of the good; namely the maximum amount one is 
willing to pay for allx units thereof. Then '( )P x is the marginal demand price of 
the x th unit. Notice that this function is the consumer’s estimate of the value 
to him of a variable amount of the good, .x  This value has the same dimensions 
as price, dollars per unit, but no actual prices are yet entering the theory. 
These values per unit are not hypothetical; literally, they are only estimates 
and they reflect intentions subject to error. They are revealed as people drop 
out of the bidding with rising bid prices at an auction, of which we must 
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suppose Adam Smith was fully aware. Although they are uncertain, and 
unknown in advance, they are real in intention and motivation. Obviously, in 
spite of the “tea” example, x is a discrete variable in practice so that ( )P x is 
trivially discontinuous. He further postulated a fictional ‘representative 
consumer’ whose demand-price would summarize or typify those of all 
consumers.  
Postulating a large market, Marshall assumed ( )P x to be a smooth function. 
The principle of diminishing marginal utility in this context simply means that
'' 0.P Classical economists, however, would have had no trouble with 
diminishing willingness to pay for successive units, which is quite explicit with 
Dupuit. Rather, their focus was on the market and representing demand 
across individuals, not a quixotic continuously variable individual demand. The 
consumer ‘surplus’ is ( ) ,P x px where p denotes, not the market price in fact, 
but a price offered by some seller: Marshall was imagining a ‘haggling and 
bargaining’ taking place in the market, even as he is illustrating the derivation 
of demand a la the neoclassicals. Demand d is defined by that quantity which 
makes for an ‘efficient’ consumption at a given price (p. 95), namely that which 
maximizes the ‘consumer’s surplus’, which is the case ‘only when the price 
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which he is willing to offer reaches that at which others are willing to sell’; that 
is, when '( )P x p so that the demand function, as with the Jevons-Walras 
general equilibrium theorist, is defined by 1( ) ' ( ).d p P p  Supply is identically 
derived. For Marshall, still wearing his classical hat, demand-price as a function 
of quantity is considered a primitive and intuitive concept in itself, and he did 
not judge it necessary to reverse the axes of his diagrams as he went from the 
marginal utility curve [ , '( )]x P x  to the demand curve 1[ , ' ( )]p P p ; and the same 
applies to supply also. A sympathetic reading suggests that Marshal’s intention 
was to preserve classical demand as representing willingness to pay value per 
unit as the dependent variable, given commodity quantity as the independent 
variable. This is precisely what people bring to the market in Marshall’s 
description of corn-price formation in a country town. People are going to 
market with intentions—willingness to pay and willingness to accept as 
functionally dependent on quantities. Having arrived at the market, they 
proceed to turn this representation on its head. When offering quantities to 
buy or sell, they are quoting prices above their minimum willingness to accept, 
or below their maximum willingness to pay. To wit, in the higgling and 
bargaining, price estimates as intentions have been transformed into 
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independent prices as contracts (if accepted), that determine realized 
quantities transacted. To Marshall’s credit he wants to explicate that classical 
process right out of Adam Smith. What survives, however, in the mind of every 
economist and student is that supply and demand is about quantities that 
maximize utility, given hypothetical prices, but demand is inverted in its 
representation in the Marshallian charts and in the math. Missing is a clear 
indication that prices as unit value intentions become the independent 
variables in the price discovery process. Hence, Marshall failed to integrate the 
old and new traditions although both were part of his thinking. 
If we examine Marshall’s theory from the perspective of how it was used in 
laboratory experiments, we can see how the utility calculus needn’t impose 
Jevons-Walras demand as ( )q d p . (Smith, 1976, p 275) Thus, subject i  is paid 
cash, 
i
M ,for
i
q units where each unit is bought at some price, 
ij
p . Total 
payment is ( ) .i
q
i i i ijj
M R q p [In Marshall above, total surplus fromx units is 
( ) .]P x px  If we impose the neoclassical hypothetical law of one price then 
( ) .
i i i i
M R q pq If ( )i iU M is i ’s utility for money paid, 
' ''( 0; 0)
i i
U U , then Max 
[ ( ) ]
i i i i
U R q pq implies ' '[ ( ) ] 0.
i i i
U R q p Since ' 0,
i
U '( ),
i i
p R q where '( )
i i
R q is 'i s 
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classical willingness to pay demand function defined on units, qi.) Smith (1976, 
p 275) being thoroughly neoclassical, inverts this function noting that it is 
induced by the reward scheme. The step inverting the demand is redundant. 
'( )
i i
R q  is the WTP demand function, corresponding to Marshal’s '( )P x  above. 
Of course, we do, indeed, have the problem that if all come to market with the 
same WTP, then only its inverse is well-defined, as in the piece-constant 
neoclassical demand experiments in Smith (1965). Now apply this procedure 
to Adam Smith and all subsequent classicalists including Marshall. They 
measured willingness to pay in terms of the maximum amount of money a 
person is willing to forgo for a unit rather than do without it. Then attach 
utility, '
i
U  to that money measure. The above calculus follows, and we get the 
classical demand function.  
So, Marshall’s project was to classically reformulate the neoclassical view on 
value, namely by avoiding the notion of utility as a measure of ‘pleasure’, 
which is a problematic notion, quantitatively and observationally speaking. 
Indeed no mention of ‘pleasure’ would appear anywhere in his theory, if not 
by his afterthought but oft-debated clause of ‘constant marginal utility of 
wealth’, whose only purpose was to adjust the demand-price for differences 
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in the utility of wealth, which is in reality not so much of a problem, as we saw 
in the text; it is only then that it erupted in his whole analysis, and in formal 
terms only in the Appendix, a pure neoclassical tone à la Walras, which can 
also be formally reproduced as follows. Letm be wealth (or ‘money’ as 
Marshall put it vaguely),26 ( )m its utility for the consumer,u the pleasure he 
enjoys in consuming the good under study, and 
1 1
,...,
n
u u the pleasures derived 
from consuming respectively
1 1
,...,
n
x x amounts of the remaining goods, the 
demand-prices of which being
1 1
( ),P x ...
1 1
, ( ).
n n
P x Let the overall pleasure 
enjoyed by the consumer be additive, that is, ( )u x
1 1
( )u x ...
1 1
( );
n n
u x his 
budget constraint is ( )P x
1 1
( )P x
1 1
... ( ) .
n n
P x m  The first-order 
maximizing condition is '( ) '( ),u x P x where  is a Lagrange multiplier, which 
if identified with the marginal utility of wealth leads to  
 
26“We tacitly assumed that the sum which purchasers were willing to pay, and which seIIers were willing                        
to take, for the seven hundredth quarter would not be affected by the question whether the earlier bargains 
had been made at a high or a low rate. We allowed for the diminution in the buyers' need of corn [its marginal 
utility to them] as the amount bought increased. But we did not allow for any appreciable change in their 
unwillingness to part with money.” (Marshall, 1890, pp 324-5) Thus indeed was Marshall vague about whether 
“ money” meant wealth or “income,” but the common interpretation as it became widely propagated was 
that the optimization problem was to maximize the utility of multiple goods subject to an income constraint 
on the sum of all expenditure, I = p1x2 + p2x2 +…pNxN.   
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 ,
du d dP
dx dm dx
 (10) 
which is the key equation of Marshall’s Mathematical Appendix (Note II). 
Assuming constant marginal utility of wealth,P becomes equivalent to .u
Through this equation, Marshall merely wanted to show the general link 
between utility in the purely neoclassical sense and utility as given by the 
demand price. Moreover, Marshall suggests that this clause of constant 
marginal-utility of wealth is inconsequential on the aggregate of many 
consumers, poor and rich combined (Marshall, [1890] 1920, pp. 15-16, 83).  
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